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ABSTRACT 
THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEMPORAL 
COGNITION IN 6- TO 10-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN  
By  
Danielle DeNigris 
Advisor: Dr. Patricia J. Brooks 
The ability to represent and make sense of time requires the mental 
representations of the ordering of events and temporal relations, abstract time concepts, 
natural biological rhythms, the self and other through time, and causal relationships.  This 
representational ability undergoes significant refinement in middle childhood concurrent 
with advances in children’s language and nonverbal skills. This study explored the 
representational development of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral 
prediction in relation to a battery of language and nonverbal abilities with the aims of 
confirming age-related improvements, exploring whether disparate measures are indices 
of an underlying ability, and examining the role of language and nonverbal abilities. 
Sixty-two children (32 girls, 30 boys, M=8 years; 2 months, range 6;0-10;8) 
completed standardized assessments of receptive vocabulary, receptive grammar, 
reading, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory, in addition to the four 
representational thought tasks.  The temporal cognition tasks consisted of the Months 
Relative Order task, assessing event ordering ability (e.g., knowledge of the sequence of 
months), and the Time Labeling task, assessing knowledge of conventional time patterns 
(e.g., day or month associated with specific events).  The diachronic thinking task, Draw 
Lifecycle of a Tree, assessed awareness of biological change over time and the behavioral 
        
 v 
prediction task, Character Intentions task (a measure of theory of mind adapted here to 
assess the ability to predict future behaviors) assessed children’s understanding of 
causality in time to infer a character’s future actions.  
The first aim was supported providing confirmation of the age-related 
improvements in representational thought documented in previous research.  Results 
revealed that accuracy on the Months Relative Order, Time Labeling, Draw Lifecycle of 
a Tree, and Character Intentions tasks improved with age; however, the Draw Lifecycle 
of a Tree task was only marginally significant. The second and third aims of the study 
was to explore whether the four disparate measures of representational were significantly 
related and if they provided evidence of an underlying ability.  All tasks were 
significantly correlated with one another after controlling for the effects of age. Principal 
components analysis revealed one underlying factor explaining 57.84% of the variance 
across tasks.  To address the final aim, stepwise regressions explored relationships 
between this latent variable and developmental changes in nonverbal intelligence, 
working memory, and language ability. Results revealed that language ability predicted 
gains in representational thought over and above effects of age, nonverbal intelligence, 
and working memory.  Additionally, mediation analyses showed that the effects of age, 
nonverbal intelligence, and working memory were mediated by language abilities. These 
results extend prior work by demonstrating the representational changes occurring in 
middle childhood across complex cognitive domains while highlighting the role of 
language as a mechanism promoting representational development.  
Keywords: representational thought; temporal cognition; diachronic thinking; 
behavioral prediction; language; middle childhood 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The ability to understand and represent time plays a critical role in supporting 
daily living (Suddendorf, 2006).  Mental representations of complex cognitive knowledge 
undergo dramatic representational change during middle childhood, changing from 
implicit (i.e., not consciously accessible) procedural knowledge to explicit (i.e., 
consciously accessible) knowledge that is able to be verbalized.  One domain in which 
representational change occurs is in the understanding of time.  The ability to make sense 
of time involves the representation of various forms of functional knowledge, including 
temporal cognition (event ordering–i.e., awareness of one event following or preceding 
another–and time labeling–i.e., knowing the days of the week or the months of the year), 
diachronic thinking (grasping biological transformations across the lifespan), and 
behavioral prediction (understanding causality in time in order to make inferences based 
on past/current events and intentions).  These disparate forms of representational 
knowledge are rarely studied within the same group of participants; hence it remains 
unclear whether they follow similar developmental trajectories and whether they are 
indices of similar underlying cognitive abilities. 
Theoretical Perspectives of Representational Development 
 Theories of cognitive development have been primarily motivated by research 
from two camps, domain-generality and domain-specificity, in which cognitive 
development progresses through the refinement of mental representations over time.  
Much of the early literature on cognitive development stemmed from a Piagetian (1926) 
model of cognitive construction.  This model takes a domain-general approach suggesting 
that development occurs sequentially (in stages) across all aspects of cognition.  As we 
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progress through stages, procedural (sensorimotor) knowledge makes way for more 
advanced mental representations of the world through the processes of assimilation (i.e., 
using existing schemas to interpret incoming information), accommodation (i.e., altering 
existing and creating new schemas to accommodate incoming information), and 
equilibration (i.e., the process in which we balance new and old information).  
In contrast, domain-specific accounts, such as the modular system proposed by 
Fodor (1983), maintain that the mind is made up of innate specified input systems 
(modules) that are responsible for acting on certain types of input.  To create mental 
representations and make sense of the world, the mind’s central processor must combine 
the output from specified modules with information stored in long-term memory.  
However, there are some critical limitations to a modular theory of domain-specificity.  
The following sections will discuss more recent approaches that argue for a similar 
developmental framework to explore how mental representations change over time.   
Karmiloff-Smith’s Representational Redescription View 
 Karmiloff-Smith (1992) provides an argument against both a fully Piagetian 
constructivist approach and a fully nativist approach to the understanding of cognitive 
development.  She argues that Piaget’s domain-general approach cannot account for 
specifically linguistic changes.  She supports this view citing research on chimpanzees 
(e.g., Premack, 1986) which have rich sensorimotor and representational abilities, but are 
unable to have complex, human-like language.  As such, the Piagetian notion that 
development occurs across the board cannot hold true for language, and as an extension, 
other specific aspects of cognition.   
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 On the other hand, Karmiloff-Smith critiques a completely modularized view of 
the domain-specificity of development (i.e., Fodor’s 1983 theory of modularity).  She 
argues against modularity on three main accounts: modules are not so pre-specified in 
detail as Fodor suggests; the dichotomy between the specified modules and the central 
processor is not as strongly divided; and the modules do not automatically encode data 
into a single language of thought.  Although she argues for domain-specificity, she draws 
a clear distinction between her theory and Fodor’s (1983) modularity.  Karmiloff-Smith’s 
theory goes “beyond modularity” to propose a domain-specific view that synthesizes neo-
nativism and constructivism.  Domains are defined as a set of representations sustaining a 
specific knowledge area (e.g., language, physics, etc.); whereas a module is a processor 
that encapsulates knowledge and conducts computations on it.  Each domain 
encompasses many microdomains, or subdomains (e.g., gravity is a microdomain of 
physics).  Karmiloff-Smith (1994) argues that development goes beyond “the triggered 
unfolding of a genetic program” (p. 706); it is a gradual process by which information 
that is in a cognitive system becomes progressively explicit knowledge to that system. 
 Karmiloff-Smith proposes a phase (not stage) theory of development in which 
recurrent phase changes occur across microdomains and within each domain.  Crucial to 
this phase theory is that development within domains does not occur at the same time 
across domains. In the first phase, the child focuses on external, procedural information 
resulting in behavioral mastery (successful performance) within that microdomain.  
Eventually (phase two) the child no longer focuses predominantly on external 
information and instead focuses on the internal representations of knowledge in that 
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microdomain.  Finally, in phase three, the internal representations and external 
information are integrated and a balance is found. 
The critical aspect in this process is representational redescription.  Karmiloff-
Smith (1992) describes this as a mental process whereby the child redescribes, or alters, 
existing internal mental representations to clear the way for more explicit and 
sophisticated representations and use of knowledge.  This process increases the flexibility 
of the knowledge that is stored in the mind and the child’s representations become 
progressively more manipulable leading to explicit (i.e., conscious) access to knowledge.  
The process of representational redescription is a uniquely human way of gaining access 
to and making use of information stored in the mind, first within a domain and then 
sometimes across domains. 
 Karmiloff-Smith posits four levels, each with different representational formats, 
in which knowledge is represented and redescribed moving from implicit to explicit.  In 
the first level, Level Implicit, information from the external environment is represented in 
procedural form.  There is no representational links within or between domains.  At the 
second level, Level Explicit-1, implicit representations are redescribed into a new explicit 
format.  These explicit representations are now manipulable and allow children to 
introduce violations to their knowledge of the world.  This allows for developments like 
false-belief; however, these representations are not available to conscious access nor able 
to be verbalized.  Level Explicit-2 enables representations to be consciously accessible, 
but still not verbalized.  Finally, at Level Explicit-3, representations are redescribed into a 
format similar to natural language that allows for both conscious access and verbal report.  
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As a result of this process, there exists multiple representations in the mind of similar 
knowledge at different levels of explicitness across domains. 
Nelson’s Experiential (Social-Cultural) View 
For Nelson (1993; 1996) children develop representational thought through lived 
experience.  Theses representations emerge through interaction with a social and cultural 
world, but are constructed according to “built in” cognitive principles.  Like Karmiloff-
Smith, Nelson believes that there are levels of representation that undergo 
representational change.  And while both theorists recognize the representational function 
of language that allows for representational change from implicit mental representations 
to explicit and linguistic representations, they differ in the specific role that language 
plays.  Where Karmiloff-Smith suggests that representational changes occur within the 
child who interacts with the physical world, Nelson believes that representational change 
occurs through socially-mediated processes.  More specifically, language plays a critical 
role in the change from implicit to explicit mental representations.  Nelson (1996) argues 
that it is the “mental representation function of language that…is the basis for the evident 
cognitive advances in the latter part of the preschool years” (p.15). 
Nelson (1996) outlines her experiential view of representational change as 
constituted by chunks of socially- and culturally-situated events that the child experiences 
that provide critical information about the events from which they are embedded.  This 
information becomes stored as mental event representations (MERs), representations of 
familiar significant repeated events.  Eventually, as the child continually adds to their 
stock of MERs, they can be generalized across events, people, places, etc. and stored in 
an increasingly elaborate “world model.”  Central to this idea, is that the child must make 
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use of previously stored information to explore and interpret current events.  The child 
must combine their previously internalized representations with the specific features of 
the present context.  This highlights the critical role of the memory system, and 
particularly episodic memory, in the development of advanced cognitive representations.  
Indeed, the child’s general knowledge base is informed by the episodic memory system, 
in which is stored event information about the location and sequence of activities that 
constitute specific events. 
The main function of a representational system is to provide information about 
present conditions, informed by the past, and to anticipate future conditions.  To do so, 
the child must accumulate information about general events.  Within an event, actions are 
sequentially organized which allows for the creation of script-like representations 
(Nelson & Gruendel, 1981).  Using these representations of repeated events, the child can 
understand “what happens in a general case.”  This script knowledge is evident in 
children as young as 3-years of age, who are able to produce verbal scripts for familiar 
events (such as having lunch).  Indeed, Nelson (1986) suggests that young children are 
more likely to produce general scripts than specific memory accounts.  The scripts 
produced by young preschoolers are found to be similar in structure to those produced by 
adults, suggesting that general script knowledge precedes more explicit forms of specific 
event representations (Nelson, 1996).  It is in this movement from implicit procedural 
scripts to explicit and verbal scripts, and then to explicit MERs that forms the backbone 
for Nelson’s experiential, and socio-cultural, theory of cognitive development. 
Nelson proposes that individual MERs support and are changed by linguistic 
representations, all of which occurs as the child is mastering language.  Throughout the 
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preschool years, language systems become organized and they begin to reorganize the 
child’s conceptual systems.  Language is based on categorical structures (e.g., phonemes, 
morphemes, word meanings, and grammatical structures); as such, children apply 
categorization strategies to the learning of language, as well as MERs.  For example, 
object concepts are first embedded in event representations.  Children experience the 
ways in which words are used by adults during social interactions and results in the 
drawing out of “event embedded object categories” and eventual representational change 
(Nelson & Lucariello, 1985), or redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).  For example, the 
child learns not only the link between the word “lunch” and the event “lunch,” but a 
“representation of an entire event sequence that incorporates the word as well as the 
props and the sequence of actions that constitute that event” (Nelson, 1996, p. 97).  These 
event categories are then combined and organized into a type of representational 
hierarchy of event knowledge.  Temporal representation, and particularly temporal 
cognition, is central to the development of event knowledge.  Time is organized 
according to domain-specific principles and varies as a function of socio-cultural and 
linguistic constructs (Nelson, 1991; 1996).   
Representational Development of Temporal Knowledge 
As adults, we make sense of time in terms of the ordering of events and temporal 
relations, abstract manipulations of time concepts, natural biological rhythms, and an 
understanding of the self and other through time.  We refer to time in terms of two basic 
dimensions, duration and sequence, that are extracted and constructed from our 
experiences and memories for events.  We also make sense of time based on our 
understanding of temporal relations or sequences (i.e., that one component occurs before 
   
 8 
and after others).  These relations become a part of the child’s developing 
representational system and may aid in the learning of the temporal language used to 
express them.  However, implicit aspects of experience (e.g., that certain events take 
place during specific times during the day/week/year and not others) are more difficult 
for young children to transform into linguistic concepts.  The regularity of events may aid 
in the understanding of conventional time concepts, such as clock-times, days, months, 
etc., and thus provide meaning for these concepts.  Particularly, as many concepts that are 
used for marking time may be based on arbitrary divisions (e.g., minutes, hours, months, 
etc.), in comparison to those based on natural cycles (e.g., morning, afternoon, day, night, 
etc.) or social events (lunchtime, naptime, etc.). 
Both Karmiloff-Smith (1992; 1994) and Nelson (1991; 1996) propose an 
approach to cognitive development based on a continual process of representational 
change from implicit (i.e., not consciously accessible) to explicit (i.e., consciously 
accessible) knowledge.  Applied to temporal knowledge, the two theories (Karmiloff-
Smith’s representational redescription and Nelson’s experiential view of event 
representations) highlight the importance of language, though they differ in its specific 
role.  Karmiloff-Smith’s theory, though not specifically making claims about the 
development of temporal knowledge, would suggest that children learn temporal 
concepts from verbal interactions with others, but that early knowledge forms are stored 
in a code not yet accessible or linked to similar knowledge stored in other forms.  Nelson, 
on the other hand, has described the emergence of the temporal mind in several 
theoretical pieces (e.g., 1991; 1993; 1996).  Time is organized according to domain-
specific principles and varies as a function of socio-cultural and linguistic constructs. She 
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suggests that an understanding of time concepts results from involvement in and 
representation of events and that this event knowledge may “implicitly embed” them 
allowing for the “explication” through language to occur.  
According to Nelson, knowledge of temporal concepts develops gradually 
through experience with language forms relevant to ongoing events as they are used by 
adults and others.  Early on, children are exposed to, and oftentimes explicitly taught, the 
temporal language about the seasons and holidays; yet, the language used to convey 
conventional time units (days, months, years, etc.) are not explicitly taught until the child 
enters formal schooling.  Because these linguistic forms are used informally in discourse, 
the child may become familiar with their forms, but when used, are often done in an 
inaccurate way without expressing true meaning.  Indeed, as the child observes its use 
across multiple contexts, the temporal word or phrase, may become more generalized.  
This constant adjustment of representation is essential as the child moves from preschool 
into early childhood.  
Building on the theoretical work by Nelson (1991; 1996) in which temporal 
cognition is understood as developing through the involvement in and representation of 
events, McCormack (2015) proposes a model of developmental stages in children’s 
representation of time in which children develop increasingly event-independent 
representations.  In the earliest stage, children orient themselves in time through creating 
representations of repeated event sequences.  Here, children’s concepts of the past, 
present, and future are of events as having been completed, ongoing, or yet to come.  It is 
not until the second stage in which children can understand the ontological difference 
between the past (i.e., unalterable) and the future (i.e., potentially alterable).  At this 
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stage, children can still not represent time independent of events nor linearly.  Linear 
representations of time occur in the third stage in which children begin to grasp how 
causality operates in time.  However, it is not until the fourth and final stage that 
children’s representations of time become completely event-independent (i.e., a 
representation of time that makes no references to events, as in the clock and calendar 
systems).  
As with the cognitive development models of Karmiloff-Smith and Nelson, 
McCormack’s (2015) model of temporal cognition proposes a shift in the way time is 
represented in the mind.  This provides a foundation for the understanding of how 
children represent the locations of events in time before fully mastering an explicit and 
verbal event-independent representational system.  McCormack’s (2015) theory suggests 
that for children to have a full mastery of event-independent temporal cognition, they 
must have a more general understanding of temporal sequence and causality.   
Summary 
Together, the three theoretical views of the role of representational change in the 
development of temporal knowledge suggests that early on children rely on procedural 
(sensorimotor) event knowledge from routinized prior experience to acquire and interpret 
basic temporal concepts and patterns that can then be altered in order to be represented 
verbally in event-independent ways.  Those concepts that are directly related to 
representations of time (e.g., sequence, duration, frequency, etc.) would be learned and 
generalized to novel contexts more easily than those concepts that are not implicit in the 
child’s mental representations (e.g., abstract concepts of temporal location and measuring 
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units).  As such, socially-mediated language provides the fundamental component for 
children to represent the passage of time.   
The current study sought to evaluate this hypothesis while assessing the extent to 
which tasks measuring disparate forms of temporal knowledge (temporal cognition, 
diachronic thinking, and behavioral prediction) relate to an underlying construct of 
temporal representation during middle childhood.  This age-range is particularly 
important for exploring the representational development of temporal knowledge, and 
cognitive development in general, because this is when children are at a level of 
representation in which knowledge is explicitly defined but may not be fully accessible to 
verbal reports.  Middle childhood represents a time where children have the basic skills 
needed for temporal representation, but may still not be fully successful in their attempts 
to pass temporal representation tasks. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REPRESENTATIONS OF TIME 
 Time has often been treated as a dimension of events with a focus on duration 
processing, but time can also be treated as a framework (e.g., a flexible mental 
representation) within which events can be located.  Temporal frameworks can be 
distinguished along the lines of perspectival (location of events is relative to where one is 
currently located in time) vs. nonperspectival (location of events is specified without 
reference to where one is currently located in time) and repeating cycles (e.g., the 
repeating cycle of the times of day, days of week, seasons of the year, etc.) vs. particular 
times (unique temporal location that does not repeat, e.g., Monday, January 2, 2017; 
McCormack, 2015).  
Unlike in many areas of developmental psychology, there is no single established 
set of tasks put forth to explore children’s representations of time.  This is likely due the 
varied ways in which temporal knowledge has been conceptualized in the literature.  In 
the following sections, the representational development of two event-independent 
components of temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling), biological temporal 
sequence (diachronic thinking), and temporal causality (behavioral prediction) are 
reviewed along with the role of verbal and nonverbal abilities in their development. 
Temporal Cognition 
Event Ordering 
        As adults, we have the ability to represent the position of events in time in terms 
of location (to mark an event’s occurrence in terms of conventional time patterns), 
distance (to estimate how far an event is from the present) and relative order (to 
determine whether an event occurred/will occur before or after some other event).  How 
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does this ability to order events in time develop? Early on, infants appear to form 
representations of routine events that occur in their daily lives, such as taking a bath, 
mealtime, or playing peek-a-boo (Bruner, 1983; Nelson, 1996; McCormack, 2015).  
These script-like representations allow young children to anticipate events in their daily 
lives and make predictions about what will happen next (Schank & Abelson, 1977; 
Forman, 2015). Scripts also allow children to locate themselves in time by locating 
themselves at a particular point within a scripted event (McCormack, 2015).  
With regards to verbalizing the order in which events unfold, children as young 
as 3 years can correctly report sequences of events, such as how to get ready for bed, and 
by the age of 4 years, they can arrange everyday events, such as waking up, eating 
breakfast, going to school, eating dinner, and going to bed, in correct temporal order 
(Friedman, 1990).  Young children’s success on this type of task suggests that they have 
ready access to temporally structured representations that provide the foundation for 
children to represent the temporal locations of events relative to each other.  Research 
indicates that event ordering abilities, although emerging during the preschool years, 
undergo developmental advances during middle childhood (Friedman, 1993; 2000; 2005; 
Friedman, Gardner, & Zubin, 1995; Friedman & Kemp, 1998; Friedman, Reese & Dai, 
2011).  Four- and 5-year-olds can make accurate judgments about the past when 
comparing two events experienced several weeks apart (Friedman et al., 1995); however, 
children at this age, as well as some older children (8- and 9-year-olds), made errors 
when asked to place future annual events (e.g., common holidays) in temporal order 
(Friedman, 2000).   
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By the time children are 8 to 10 years, they can reliably order the months of the 
year and can successfully integrate the order of conventional time labels with the fact that 
they are cyclical and reoccur (Friedman, 1978).  At this point, children can then start to 
order temporal sequences using different starting points.  However, children find it more 
difficult to conduct relative order tasks using different starting points for months of the 
year than for days of the week (Friedman, 1978).  More recent work (Moore et al., 2014), 
asking children to sequence events in forward or backward order, confirmed that older 
children (8- to 10-year-olds) were more accurate in ordering events than younger children 
(5- to 7-year-olds).  
Together, these results suggest that early on children can verbally represent the 
temporal locations of actions within repeated script-like events relative to each other.  
These scripts enable children to locate events relative to other events within thematic 
contexts (e.g., holidays, daily routine, going to the supermarket, etc.).  However, scripts 
do not provide children with a way to locate events from one thematic context relative to 
events from another unrelated context (McCormack, 2015).  Compare this to the clock 
and calendar systems which allow children to consider the relative temporal locations of 
any two events, whether they are related or not.  Yet, these systems are not mastered until 
middle-late childhood (Friedman, 2000). 
Time Labeling 
Children’s understanding of life events depends upon their understanding of time 
concepts and an implicit understanding of temporal relations (Nelson, 1996).  As such, 
children must have a functional representation system for time in terms of sequence, 
duration, and frequency.  These implicit aspects of experience may be difficult for young 
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children to translate into linguistic concepts and they may instead make use of event 
labels (e.g., lunch) that are based in daily routines prior to using other conventional time 
labels (e.g., 12 o’clock).  For example, preschool children typically respond to time-
related questions about an event by referencing other events or by thinking about time in 
terms of their distance from the present, rather than locating the event on a calendar or 
referencing the associated time of the day (McCormack, 2015; Nelson, 1996).  
Eventually, children learn to link regularly experienced events with times of the day or 
the year which serves to ground the meaning of specific time labels, such as 12 o’clock or 
noon, in relation to events, such as lunch.  It is not until middle childhood that children 
reliably use conventional calendar terms, such as days and months of the year, in place of 
event-based or distance-based judgements to mark time. 
Under Nelson’s view, initial learning of temporal concepts occurs informally in 
the context of social interaction.  Children’s first temporal references are usually 
“interpretatively framed by adults (e.g., the child says ‘berries’ and the adult responds 
‘Yes, we ate berries for breakfast this morning, didn’t we?’)” (Nelson & Fivush, 2004, p. 
492).  Temporal concepts are elaborated through conversational language, especially in 
contexts where caregivers and children reminisce about past events and plan for the 
future.  Many lexical and grammatical terms integral to the discussion of events, such as 
relative and specific time labels (e.g., tomorrow, November) and locators (e.g., before, 
after, during) are learned through conversation and begin to be used more consistently at 
around the age of 5 years (Nelson, 1996; Weist, 1986).   
Upon school entry, children are formally taught specific concepts of temporality, 
such as the days, months, seasons, and holidays of the year. By around 6 to 7 years, 
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children can recite sequences of time labels, such as the days of the week, in order, and at 
around 9 years of age, they show understanding of the cyclical nature of time (Friedman, 
1978).  In one study, Friedman, Reese, and Dai (2011) examined memory for the times of 
events that had occurred in the past 6 months to 4 years, and observed that 8- to 12-year-
old children were able to localize many of the events in time in terms of the season, 
month, and time of day.  Using similar tasks, Moore and colleagues (2014) found that 8- 
to 10-year-olds were more accurate in their labeling of time concepts than 5- to 7-year-
olds.  However, research indicates that even in this age range children make errors.  
Friedman and Laycock (1989) suggested that children possess knowledge of individual 
time markers (e.g., knowing the month of one’s birthday or the clock times of an activity) 
before understanding the conventional system (e.g., order of the months or times of day) 
as a whole.  These findings suggest that by middle childhood, children are beginning to 
master conventional temporal systems and use them along with their knowledge of 
repeated events within the annual cycle to aid in the ability to locate events in time 
(McCormack, 2015).  The mastery of the clock and calendar systems enables children to 
flexibly represent time in a linear, unified, event-independent way. 
Diachronic Thinking 
        Diachronic thinking, defined as the capacity to represent and understand changes 
that occur over time, has been extensively explored by Montangero, Pons, and colleagues 
from a Piagetian framework in which a child’s actions and observations of the world lead 
the child to construct more abstract conceptualizations of object transformations over 
time (e.g., Boucher et al., 2007; Montangero, 1985; Montangero, Pons, & Cattin, 2000; 
Pons & Montangero, 1999; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992). This can be compared to 
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Nelson’s (1996) discussion of natural time, or time thought of in terms of basic biological 
rhythms and cycles of the natural world.  One widely studied aspect of diachronic 
thinking concerns children’s understanding of qualitative biological changes, for 
example, the understanding that a seed becomes a plant and an infant becomes an adult, 
all the while never changing in identity.   
Children’s understanding of biological transformation has been investigated in 
relation to the life cycle of plants and animals (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Labrell & 
Stefaniak, 2011; Leddon, Waxman, & Medin, 2008; Maurice-Naville & Montangero, 
1992; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992) where children come to understand time relating to 
birth, death, and aging.  Research suggests that children do not initially include plants in 
the “living” domain (Nguyen & Gelman, 2002), which Labrell and Stefaniak (2011) 
suggested was due to the fact that the surface properties of plants do not promote this 
classification.  Hickling and Gelman (1995) reported that although children as young as 4 
years of age understood the origins of seeds, they did not understand the diachronic 
conception of biology (i.e., that growth is a cycle of changes over time).  As such, the 
understanding of time is integral to the development of diachronic thinking; yet, apart 
from Montangero (1996), few have explored the connection of time and diachronic 
change.  
According to Montangero, the temporal concepts of span, sequentiality, and 
chronology are fundamental to an advanced understanding of biological change.  
Children appear to progress through three levels of diachronic thinking (Maurice-Naville 
& Montangero, 1992; Montangero, Pons & Scheidegger, 1996; Pons & Montangero, 
1999; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992).  At the first level, they fail to construct links 
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between past, present, and future stages of life (i.e., change is not thought of as a 
continuous process).  At the second level, emerging at around 9 years of age, children 
conceive of continuous change, but only in quantitative terms (i.e., growth).  At the third 
stage, thought to emerge at 11 or 12 years of age, children grasp that objects change both 
quantitatively and qualitatively over time.   
Other researchers (e.g., Cox & Hodsoll, 2000; Labrell & Stefaniak, 2011; Nguyen 
& Gelman, 2002) have argued that children grasp aspects of diachronic change at earlier 
ages than those proposed by Montangero and colleagues (e.g., Maurice-Naville & 
Montangero, 1992; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992).  For example, Labrell and Stefaniak 
(2011) examined the development of the diachronic conceptions of growth and death of 
plants and animals among 163 children aged 6 to 11 years.  Results showed a main effect 
of age with 6- and 7-year-olds performing more poorly than older children; however, the 
researchers failed to observe differences among children between 8 and 11 years of age 
on either the animal or plant tasks.  Nevertheless, despite some disagreements about the 
precise ages at which children pass specific tasks, these studies and others (e.g., Moore et 
al., 2014) indicate significant changes in diachronic thinking in middle childhood. 
Causality and the Prediction of Future Behaviors 
In order to understand and interact with others, a child must be successful at the 
prediction of others’ and one’s own future actions and reactions (Nelson, 1996).  The 
ability to predict future events likely draws upon the temporal skills previously reviewed, 
as well as the understanding of the causal structure that connects events in time 
(McCormack, 2015).  The ability to distinguish between past and future events involves 
the ability to take a temporal perspective other than the present.  For example, “it 
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involves realizing that from the perspective of the past, some events were in the future 
that are now in the past, and from the perspective of the future, events will be in the past 
that are now in the future” (McCormack, 2015, p. 654).  This ability to shift temporal 
perspective relies upon the understanding of how causality operates in time.   
However, a majority of the literature on children’s projective minds focuses on 
their ability to plan for a specific future task or their understanding of others’ mental 
states (i.e., theory of mind).  Of the research focused on future planning, many have been 
concerned with the emergence of future-oriented thinking in preschool-aged children, 
with a typical task requiring children to select items for use in a future event.  For 
example, Atance and O’Neill (2005) asked 3-year-olds to imagine going on a trip with 
their parents; children were shown a group of eight items of which they had to choose 
three to take on the trip and to provide a reason for their choice.  Justifications were 
coded for reference to present or future states.  Results showed that the 3-year-olds 
referred to the future 37% of the time when choosing items for their trip, compared with 
46% referral to the present.   
Similarly, Atance and Meltzoff (2005) gave 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds a book with 
different landscapes and asked them to choose an item that they would take with them if 
they were walking across the landscape in the photograph and to explain their choices.  
Choices were tailored to each photograph, e.g., given a photograph of a sunny desert, 
children chose between sunglasses, soap, and a mirror (with the sunglasses being the 
correct choice because in the future scenario one could anticipate wanting to shield the 
eyes from the sun).  Not only did older children choose the correct choice more often than 
younger children, they also provided more future-oriented reasons for their choice.  
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Russell, Alexis, and Clayton (2010) replicated these findings with children selecting 
items needed to play a future game.  Together these findings support the claims (e.g., 
Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Russell et al., 2010) that the ability to 
think about the future emerges during the preschool years.  However, little is known 
about the development of this ability beyond the preschool years.   
To fully grasp that events in the future are altered by events occurring between 
now and then (and that events from the past influence present actions and events), 
children must be able to think about points in time as representing a temporal sequence 
with open slots at the end that can be filled in various ways (McCormack, 2015).  The 
ability to predict future behaviors relies on an understanding of temporal order and an 
ability to situate events in time.  Additionally, to move beyond general script memory to 
episodic “autonoetic” memory (i.e., the awareness of our existence and identity extending 
from the personal past through the present to the future; Mahr & Csibra, 2017; Tulving, 
1972; 1985), the child must have an understanding of the self in time.  This includes 
awareness of how a person’s current and future actions are influenced by past experiences 
and other people.  Theory of mind provides children with the tools needed to understand 
the subjective nature of memories and to appreciate that others may hold different beliefs, 
values, and thoughts that cause them to act in various ways.  As such, theory of mind is 
necessary for making behavioral predictions.  As the child comes to understand and 
interpret what other people believe, they become able to predict their actions based on 
these interpretations. 
The ability to track the mental lives and experiences of individuals typically does 
not emerge until the ages of 3 to 5 years as demonstrated in the theory of mind literature 
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(see Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008, for a review).  However, few have explored 
developments in theory of mind in middle childhood (see Aldrich & Brooks, 2017; 
Cantin, Gnaedinger, Gallaway, Hesson-McInnis & Hund, 2016; Miller, 2009; 2012 for 
exceptions).  More so, majority of research has focused on false-belief tasks, wherein a 
child must predict the behavior of a character who holds a mistaken belief about an object 
(e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983), which requires an understanding of intentional mental 
states.  This line of research tends to have a ceiling effect after the age of 5 years, limiting 
its utility in exploring developments beyond emergence (Devine & Hughes, 2013).  The 
literature focusing on tasks suitable for studying advanced theory of mind has explored 
tasks requiring perspective taking (e.g., Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant & Todd, 
2011), understanding others’ beliefs (e.g., Devine & Hughes, 2013; Happé, 1994), and 
identifying others’ emotions (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 
2001), and suggest that theory of mind continues to develop into adolescence.  These 
types of advanced theory of mind tasks may tap into similar cognitive abilities needed in 
behavioral prediction, as one would likely draw on others’ perspectives, beliefs, and 
emotional states in order to make predictions about their future behaviors.  
Influence of Language and Nonverbal Abilities 
Concurrent with the development of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking and 
behavioral prediction skills, children are advancing their language and nonverbal skills.  
The literature highlights the links between temporal knowledge and nonverbal 
intelligence (e.g., Moore et al., 2014) and general memory systems (see Nelson, 1996 for 
a review); however, a much larger body of literature has discussed the importance of 
various language skills on the development of disparate forms of temporal representation.  
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Links between temporal representation and children’s ability to understand and use 
temporal terms and verb tenses have been proposed (Harner, 1975; 1980; Weist, 1986), 
suggesting that children can reason about the past and future only once they can flexibly 
use verbal constructions that convey temporal meanings.  As discussed previously, 
Nelson (1991; 1996) provides a theoretical perspective highlighting the ways in which 
language and experience inform and change mental representations.  Children are thought 
to develop representations of temporal concepts and patterns through informal 
experiences with the language forms (i.e., grammar and the lexicon) related to temporal 
knowledge during ongoing activities.  
Grammar is integral in the understanding of temporal relations; it encompasses 
tense, aspect, and syntactic constructions that indicate temporal perspective.  Although, 
toddlers begin to refer to the past in terms of just-completed tasks or familiar routines 
(e.g., “All gone”; Fivush & Nelson, 2004), it is not until the age of 2 to 3 years of age that 
the child’s vocabulary increases, producing short sentences and engaging in 
conversations with others.  At this age, children begin to use past and future tense and 
other temporal grammatical structures, but often inaccurately.  Gerhardt (1989) argues 
that young children’s early use of tense and aspect are not true distinctions between past 
and present, but rather present and not-present.  As such, children must continually adjust 
their grammatical representations of time before accurately distinguishing between 
temporal perspectives.  Indeed, between the ages of 3 and 7 years, children’s accurate use 
and understanding of the past and future tense increases dramatically (Harner, 1975; 
1980).  Regarding temporal language, grammar is proposed to precede semantic 
conceptualizations (Nelson, 1996).  These semantic conceptualizations can take the form 
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of nouns, adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions and can refer to a location in time, a 
sequence of events, or a duration of time.   
There is debate in the field as to whether all or only particular aspects of language 
are involved in reprensentational development, with a significant body of research in the 
domain of theory of mind.  Here it is argued that certain theory of mind skills, e.g., 
inferring intentions and making predictions, are an integral component in the 
development of temporal knowledge and reflect an understanding of the causal and linear 
characteristics of time (McCormack, 2015).  Research from this literature has 
predominantly debated the role of semantic ability (facts) versus syntactic ability (rules).  
For example, some (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; deVilliers, 2005) argue that 
measures of syntax and memory for sentential complements allow the child to represent 
the beliefs of others and would therefore be important in the development of theory of 
mind.  Alternatively, semantics allow a child to participate in social conversations that 
become the basis for the development of the mental representations needed to represent 
the beliefs of others (Nelson, 2005; note that Nelson also highlights the importance of 
grammar).  A recent meta-analysis of 104 studies of theory of mind in children under the 
age of 7 indicates that general language abilities were more strongly related to theory of 
mind than any specific aspect of language (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007).  A study 
of theory of mind in middle childhood (Grazzani & Ornaghi, 2012) demonstrated a link 
between theory of mind and metacognitive language comprehension, use of 
psychological lexicon, and general verbal ability, again suggesting that the specific type 
of language measure is not integral to the relationship between representational thought 
and language. 
   
 24 
This is the perspective held by Bates (1994; Bates & Goodman, 1997) who argues 
for the inseparability of grammar and the lexicon in the development of representational 
thought.  She argues that since grammar and the lexicon develop similarly in infancy and 
break down similarly in brain-injured patients, the two are therefore represented together 
in the mind and processed by the same mechanisms for other cognitive abilities.  Like 
Nelson (1996), Bates (1994) proposes that language is a system embedded in time and 
that language learning is fundamental to the development of temporal cognition and other 
temporal representations and vice versa.  As such, the current study aims to explore the 
links between various components of language (receptive vocabulary, receptive grammar, 
and reading) and nonverbal (nonverbal intelligence and working memory) abilities in the 
representational development of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral 
prediction during middle childhood. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CURRENT RESEARCH 
Rationale 
Despite the verbal and nonverbal gains that are apparent in middle-childhood, a 
time when children are entering formal schooling and becoming increasingly independent 
in managing their own schedules, much of the literature on the development of temporal 
cognition has focused on its emergence.  This study seeks to explore temporal cognition 
in relation to other aspects of temporal representation (diachronic thinking and behavioral 
prediction) to confirm the age-related representational changes that have been 
documented in the literature (e.g., Boucher et al., 2013; Friedman, 2000; McCormack, 
2015; Moore et al., 2014) in a community sample of 6- to 10-year-old children.  We 
utilized two tasks of temporal cognition, Months Relative Order and Time Labeling, to 
assess event ordering and time labeling abilities, respectively.  Additionally, we utilized 
two additional tasks of complex temporal representation, Draw Lifecycle of a Tree and 
Character Intentions, to assess diachronic thinking and behavioral prediction, 
respectively.  The Character Intentions task is a novel means of exploring behavioral 
prediction as this task was originally designed to assess advanced theory of mind by 
requiring individuals to predict the future behavior of characters by inferring their 
intentions.  This type of theory of mind task requires similar skills needed in many future 
planning and behavioral prediction tasks and requires an understanding of the causal 
nature of time, making it a unique way to explore an aspect of representational thought 
necessary for a full mastery of temporal cognition. 
This research also examines individual differences in task performance on the 
four measures as evidence that underlying changes apply across disparate aspects of 
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cognition.  Building on work by Moore and colleagues (2014) who explored individual 
differences in event ordering, time labeling and diachronic thinking over middle 
childhood, we used principal components analysis to determine whether disparate 
measures of temporal representation would load onto one or more underlying factors.  
Moore et al. (2014) observed performance on battery of event ordering, time labeling, 
and diachronic thinking tasks to load onto two factors, with Factor 1 associated with 
performance across all tasks, as well as measures of verbal and nonverbal intelligence, 
and Factor 2 distinguishing one of the measures of diachronic thinking from the spatial 
event ordering task and the time labeling task.  Their study provided a starting point for 
the exploration of representational change in the domain of temporal knowledge; 
however, there are several notable limitations to address.  The first is that the researchers 
used standardized scores in regression analyses.  Considering that the regressions also 
included age as a predictor, this is problematic as standardized scores already have parsed 
out age effects.  Yet, that the results of vocabulary remained significant suggests the 
strength of the contribution of language to temporal abilities above and beyond age-
related changes.  
Additionally, the study conducted by Moore and colleagues (2014) included only 
one assessment of verbal ability (receptive vocabulary) and one assessment of nonverbal 
ability (nonverbal intelligence).  Considering what is theorized about the contribution of 
language to temporal abilities, studies employing a battery of language assessments are 
needed.  This is particularly helpful in teasing apart the debate on the separability of 
grammar and the lexicon (e.g., Bates & Goodman, 1997; de Villiers, 2005). Additionally, 
research should include additional measures of nonverbal abilities, particularly those 
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measuring executive function skills as these have been found to contribute to temporal 
abilities such as planning (e.g., Cohen, 1996; Owen, 1997; Gilhooly, 2005).   
Therefore, the current study examines performance on two traditional tasks of 
temporal cognition in relation to temporal tasks of diachronic thinking and behavioral 
prediction.  This study explores the relationship of these four disparate tasks and various 
indices of verbal and nonverbal abilities.  Including measures of receptive vocabulary, 
receptive grammar, and reading is integral for a study exploring the role of language in 
the development of temporal cognition and related temporal representation abilities to 
determine if gains are driven by general or specific language abilities above and beyond 
the influence of nonverbal abilities.  
Research Aims 
 This study explores the role of language in the development of temporal 
representation in middle childhood.  Specifically, the current study examines the relations 
among tasks of temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling), diachronic 
thinking, and behavioral prediction across age, as well as the role of verbal and nonverbal 
abilities among a community sample of 6- to 10-year-old children.  The aims of the 
current study are guided by the following research questions: 
1. Does performance on temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral 
prediction tasks provide support for the age-related improvements in 
representational thought reported in prior research? 
2. Is performance on two traditional tasks of temporal cognition (event ordering and 
time labeling) related to performance on tasks of diachronic thinking and 
behavioral prediction?  
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3. Does the shared variance in performance across these four tasks provide evidence 
that underlying changes in representational thought apply across disparate aspects 
of cognition?  
4. What is the role of language and nonverbal abilities in the development of 
temporal representation in middle childhood? 
a. More specifically, does language predict gains in representational change 
above and beyond the influence of age and nonverbal abilities? 
b. Are representational changes better predicted by specific language abilities 
or general language? 
Research has documented increased temporal abilities throughout middle 
childhood in temporal cognition (e.g., Friedman, 2000; Moore et al., 2014), as well as in 
diachronic thinking (e.g., Boucher et al., 2013; Montangero, 1996; Moore et al., 2014).  
To my knowledge, there has not been formal research on behavioral predictions related to 
temporal knowledge in middle childhood; however, research suggests that middle 
childhood is a time of increasing theory of mind and perspective taking abilities (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Dumontheil et al., 2010; Happé, 1994).  Therefore, it is 
predicted that age will be correlated with all four tasks in the current study.  Additionally, 
based on the work by Moore and colleagues (2014) who reported links between tasks of 
event ordering, time labeling, and diachronic thinking, it is hypothesized that the four 
tasks in the current study will load onto one factor, providing support for an underlying 
representational ability across disparate forms of temporal knowledge. 
The final aim of the paper is to explore the roles of language and nonverbal 
abilities in the development of temporal representation.  Both Karmiloff-Smith (1992; 
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1994) and Nelson (1991; 1996) propose a driving role of language in cognitive 
development in that language provides the representational format for making procedural 
(sensorimotor) knowledge more explicit (consciously accessible).  Although the current 
study will be the first to explore various components of representational change in 
relation to a battery of language and nonverbal assessments, prior work suggests that 
language will predict gains beyond the contributions of age, nonverbal intelligence, and 
working memory.  Here it is proposed that language is an interconnected system and not 
a mere labeling of time concepts; as such, verbal mediation of representational 
development across domains of temporal knowledge (temporal cognition, diachronic 
thinking, and behavioral prediction) will be explored.  Lastly, it is predicted that 
regardless of the language assessment entered in to the model, language will predict gains 
above and beyond age and nonverbal abilities.  Support for this hypothesis comes from 
the research of Bates (1998; Bates et al., 1979; Bates & Goodman, 1997) on the general 
role that language plays in the development of symbolic or representational thought and 
the inseparability of grammar and the lexicon.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 62 school-aged children, 30 boys and 32 girls (M = 8 years; 2 
months, SD = 1;3, range 6;0−10;8) from the New York City metropolitan area, primarily 
Staten Island and New Jersey.  Participants were recruited through a child subject pool or 
using flyers posted at the college and neighboring institutions.  Parents were asked to fill 
out an online background questionnaire about themselves and their children (see 
Appendix A).  Ethnicity was distributed as follows: 64.5% Caucasian (n = 40), 11.3% 
Black/African American (n = 7), 6.5% Middle Eastern (n = 4), 4.8% Hispanic/Latino (n = 
3), 1.6% Asian (n = 1), and 11.3% Mixed Race (n = 7).  Formal socio-economic status 
information was not obtained, however, see Appendix B for parent education level. All 
children were native speakers of English; ten children spoke another language in addition 
to English at home.  None of the children met clinical cut-offs for language disorders 
(Core Language Score: M = 105.87; SD = 13.15; range = 75 – 126) as evidenced by 
scores on the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals–Fourth Edition (CELF–4; 
Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2003; see also Appendix C for parental report of children’s 
language abilities).  Institutional Review Board approval was obtained.  Informed consent 
was obtained from parents and children provided written assent.  Families were given $20 
gift cards at the end of each session as compensation for their time.  
Materials and Measures 
Temporal Representation Tasks   
 Four tasks were selected from the published literature to evaluate relationships 
among disparate assessments of temporal representation. 
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Months Relative Order task (Friedman, 2000). This temporal cognition task is a 
measure of event ordering ability that assessed children’s abilities to position specific 
months in relation to other months.  Children were shown stimulus cards, each with the 
name of a month written on it.  Eight stimulus cards were used in total, displaying the 
name of a month (two months randomly selected from each quarter of the calendar year).  
On each of eight trials, children were given two response choices (four and eight months 
in the future) and asked to indicate the month that would come next in the calendar 
(Figure 1).  For example, individual questions would take the form: “Does February or 
June come next after October?” (Friedman, 2000, p. 928).  Each response was scored as 
correct (score of 1) or incorrect (score of 0).  Scores were tallied across the trials and 
averaged to create an overall accuracy score. 
 
 
Figure 1. Months Relative Order stimulus and response choice cards. 
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        Time Labeling task (adapted from months of the holidays task; Friedman, 
2000).  This temporal cognition task is an assessment of children’s knowledge of 
conventional time patterns that involved associating events with a specific day of the 
week or month of the year.  Children were presented with stimulus cards (summer, 
Christmas, start of the school year, Thanksgiving, Halloween, Valentine’s Day, start of 
the school week, and weekend; Figure 2) one at a time in random orders.  Children were 
asked, “What month(s) is(are) ____?” for each of the four holidays, summer, and start of 
school year cards, and “What day(s) of the week is(are) ____?” for the start of the school 
week and weekend cards.  Each response was scored as correct (score of 1) or incorrect 
(score of 0).  For the summer and weekend cards, responses were scored as correct if the 
child responded with any combination of the correct responses.  Scores were tallied 
across the 8 trials and averaged to create an overall accuracy score. 
 
Figure 2. Time Labeling Task stimulus cards (note that the calendar card was 
used for “start of the school week” and “weekend” trials). 
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Draw Lifecycle of a Tree task (adapted from Transformation task; Boucher, 
Pons, Lind, & Williams, 2007).  This diachronic thinking task is an assessment of 
children’s understanding of biological change and transformation.  Children were given a 
blank sheet of paper and a set of colored pencils/markers and asked to draw a picture of a 
tree.  After completing the drawing, children were given two additional sheets of paper, 
one to the left and one to the right of the paper with their drawing of the tree, and told: “I 
want you to draw some more pictures to show me the whole life of the tree, how it looked 
before this and how it will look after this.  I’ll write “Before” over here (paper on the 
left), and “After‟ over here (paper on the right).  You can draw as many pictures as you 
like.  Remember to draw the whole life of the tree” (Boucher et al., 2007, p. 1416- 1417).  
Non-specific prompts (e.g., “Now show me how it looked after this” or “Remember, I 
want you to draw the whole life of the tree”) were provided as necessary.  Any comments 
made by children while drawing were written down.  Testing was terminated when a 
child drew at least one before and one after picture.  Modified by Moore and colleagues 
(2014) from the original transformation task, if a child failed to draw a picture, the 
researcher asked if the child knew how to draw what they were thinking about.  If this 
was the case, the child was asked to explain what he or she would like to draw and the 
response was written verbatim on the paper.  The sets of trees were scored from 0 to 2 
(Figure 3), with a score of 0 reflecting drawings that differed only in size with no 
indication of a qualitative change (e.g., three drawings of similar-looking trees increasing 
in height), a score of 1 reflecting drawings that differed in size and depicted a qualitative 
change in either the before or after drawings (e.g., a smaller, but qualitatively similar tree 
to the original drawing and a tree without leaves, a tree lying on the ground, or just a 
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stump), and a score of 2 for drawings that included trees showing qualitative changes in 
both the before and after drawings (e.g., drawings of a seedling or young shoot, a tree, 
and a fallen tree or stump).  In instances where verbal responses or comments were 
recorded, the child received a score that reflected what he or she said the drawing was.  
 
 
Figure 3. Draw Lifecycle of a Tree scoring examples. 
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Character Intentions task (modified from Brunet et al., 2003).  This 
behavioral prediction task was originally developed as a nonverbal assessment of theory 
of mind for adults with schizophrenia, but was adapted here for use with children to 
explore behavioral prediction and the understanding of causality in time. The task 
required children to infer a character’s future action from a series of depicted events.  The 
task consisted of 16 short, 3-picture comic strips, each featuring a character with a 
specific intention (Figure 4).  Children were provided a choice of 3 possible conclusions 
to each scenario in the form of answer cards.  One answer card was a logical conclusion 
that matched the character’s intention and causal sequence (far right) and 2 answer cards 
were distractors: one unrelated to the context of the scenario (far left) and one not 
unrelated, but with no causal link to the intentional context of the scenario (middle). 
Scored across trials were tallied and averaged to create an overall accuracy score. 
 
 
Figure 4. Character Intentions task (printed with permission from Brunet et al., 2003) 
cartoon trial (top) and response choices (bottom). 
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Assessments of Language Abilities 
Global language.  The Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals–Fourth 
Edition (CELF–4; Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2003) is a norm-referenced assessment of 
receptive and expressive language abilities related to content, memory, and structure 
suitable for individuals between the ages of 5 and 21 years; 11 months.  To characterize 
the sample and test for the presence of a language disorder, all children completed the 
following sections: Concepts and Following Directions, Recalling Sentences, Formulated 
Sentences, Word Classes-Receptive, Word Classes-Total.  Additionally, children ages 6 
to 8 years completed the Word Structure and Sentence Structure sections; while children 
ages 9  to 11 years completed the Word Classes-Expressive section.   
Receptive vocabulary.  The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test–Fourth Edition 
(PPVT–4; Dunn & Dunn, 2007) is a norm-referenced, untimed test of receptive 
vocabulary (i.e., understanding of spoken language) for Standard American English 
suitable for individuals between the ages of 2 years; 6 months and 90+ years.  Children 
were presented with sets of four pictures, one set at a time.  The examiner spoke a word 
referring to one of the four pictures and the child was asked to point to the picture that 
best fit the word.  For example, if the child was presented a page with pictures of a dog, 
chair, boy, and bicycle, the examiner asked, “Can you point to the picture of the boy?” 
After the child pointed to a picture on the page, the examiner proceeded to the next set of 
pictures.  Items were organized in ascending order based on difficulty level.   
Receptive grammar.  The Test for the Reception of Grammar–Second Edition 
(TROG–2; Bishop, 2003) is a measure of the understanding of grammatical contrasts 
suitable for individuals from the age of 4 through adulthood.  The test targets sentence 
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comprehension and contains 80 stimulus items arranged in blocks of 4, where children 
were required to point to one of the four items that they consider is correct.  Children 
were tested on 20 grammatical concepts.  Items were organized in ascending order based 
on difficulty level.  
Reading ability.  The Woodcock Reading Mastery Tests–Third Edition (WRMT–
3; Woodcock, 2011) is a norm-referenced assessment of reading readiness and 
achievement.  Children completed the following sections: Word Identification, Word 
Attack, Word Comprehension (Antonyms, Synonyms, Analogies), Passage 
Comprehension, and Oral Reading Fluency.  These subtests yielded scores of children’s 
basic reading skills (first two subtests), reading comprehension (third and fourth 
subtests), and oral reading fluency (fifth subtest).  Test items were organized in ascending 
order based on difficulty level. 
Assessments of Nonverbal Abilities 
 Nonverbal intelligence.  The Test of Nonverbal Intelligence–Third Edition 
(TONI–3; Brown, Sherbenou, & Johnsen, 1997) is a language-free assessment of 
intelligence, aptitude, abstract reasoning, and problem solving suitable for individuals 
between the ages of 6 years and 89 years; 11 months.  The test consisted of 60 items 
arranged in order of increasing difficulty.  Children were presented with a series of 
shapes/patterns, with one empty space in the series.  Children then chose, among possible 
shapes/patterns, the one that best completed the series.  
Working memory.  The 1-shape array memory task (Cowan, AuBuchon, 
Gilchrist, Ricker & Saults, 2011; Cowan, Morey, AuBuchon, Zwilling, & Gilchrist, 
2010) is an assessment of working memory ability suitable for school-aged children 
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(Figure 5).  Children were instructed to attend to a set of colored circles that appeared in a 
grid of 12 boxes for 500 ms duration.  After the grid disappeared, it appeared again with a 
single, colored circle (the probe item) and children were asked to decide where the 
stimulus belonged (no change, location change, or new color).  To make the task more 
engaging for children, the grid was presented as a classroom with the colored circles 
representing students with different colored shirts.  Children were instructed to click the 
seat (box) in which the student (probe item) belonged and if that student (probe item) did 
not belong anywhere in the classroom, the door icon was to be clicked to send the student 
(probe item) to the principal’s office.  Children completed 6 practice trials followed by 32 
test trials. 
 
Figure 5. 1-Shape Array Memory task (Cowan et al., 2010; 2011) with no change, 
location change, and new color probe trials. 
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Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a laboratory at an urban, public college over 
two sessions of approximately 2 hours in duration.  The majority of the sessions were 
conducted by the author of this dissertation.  Other sessions were conducted by a second 
doctoral candidate and three undergraduate research assistants.  Research assistants were 
trained to administer all assessments and were supervised to ensure the accuracy of 
procedures.  The order of tasks was counterbalanced across participants. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: OVERVIEW OF ANALYSES 
Scoring of Tasks and Assessments 
Trained research assistants scored data from the 62 participants.  Standardized 
assessments received a second pass to double-check scoring.  The working memory task 
was scored by the computer.  Inter-rater reliability was calculated for the scoring of all 
experimental tasks.  The author of this dissertation served as the second rater and scored 
data from 13 participants for all tasks.  All disagreements were resolved through 
discussion.  Inter-rater reliability was above 90% on all tasks.  Arcsine transformations 
were performed on all proportional data. 
Analytic Plan 
As preliminary analyses, we computed partial correlations (controlling for age) 
between each temporal representation task (event ordering, time labeling, diachronic 
thinking, and behavioral prediction) and individual measures of language and nonverbal 
abilities.  Due to issues of multicollinearity between the language assessments, we 
subjected them to a principal components analysis.  We then computed Pearson 
correlation coefficients between each temporal representation task and age to confirm the 
age-related advances documented in the literature.  Next, we explored whether the 
disparate measures of representational change were significantly related using 
correlations and principal components analysis.  We computed additional partial 
correlations (controlling for age) between the temporal representation component and 
individual language and nonverbal assessments.  In order to address the fourth aim of our 
study and explore relationships between temporal representation and developmental 
changes in language ability, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory, we ran 
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stepwise regression models.  We next conducted mediation analyses to further examine 
the role of language in the representational development of temporal abilities.  Finally, 
we ran five stepwise regression analyses entering individual language measures in the 
final step to determine if representational abilities are driven by specific language 
abilities as opposed to general language skills.  
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
The mean accuracy for the temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and 
behavioral prediction tasks are presented in Table 1.  As can be seen in the table, children 
had a range of representational abilities.   
 
Table 1 
Mean accuracy for temporal representation tasks. 
Tasks Mean (SD) Range 
Temporal Cognition   
Months Relative Order  75.4% (23.7) 25 – 100% 
Time Labeling  
 
71.3% (28.5) 0 – 100% 
Diachronic Thinking   
Draw Lifecycle of a Tree  
 
60.5% (34.0) 0 – 100% 
Behavioral Prediction   
Character Intentions 
 
73.9% (19.2) 13 – 100% 
 
 
The mean standardized and raw scores for assessments of receptive vocabulary, 
receptive grammar, reading ability, and nonverbal intelligence, as well as mean accuracy 
(percent correct) for performance on the working memory task, are presented in Table 2.  
The sample displayed diverse verbal and nonverbal abilities. 
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Table 2 
Mean standardized and raw scores for language and nonverbal tasks. 
 Standardized Scores Raw Scores 
Assessments Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range 








103.0 (15.2) 67 – 130 15.0 (3.4) 5 – 20 










78 – 145 
77 – 144 




0 – 67 
0 – 80 
0 – 62 




114.3 (13.8) 81 – 144 21.1 (6.4) 4 – 34 
Working Memory  
(percent correct) 




Next, we conducted partial correlations, controlling for age (in months), between 
temporal cognition, diachronic thinking and behavioral prediction tasks and individual 
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Due to issues of multicollinearity among the standardized assessments of verbal 
abilities (Table 4), we subjected the raw scores of receptive vocabulary (PPVT–4), 
receptive grammar (TROG–2), and reading (three subscales of WRMT–3) assessments to 
principal components analysis.   
 
Table 4 
Pearson correlation coefficients between language assessments (raw scores). 







Zero-Order Correlations   
PPVT–4 .67**** .64**** .76**** .66**** 









– – – .85**** 
Partial Correlations (controlling for age)  
PPVT–4 .63**** .51**** .65**** .53**** 









– – – .78**** 
****p < .001 
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The principal components analysis met the assumptions of linearity (all variables 
had at least one correlation coefficient greater than 0.30), sampling adequacy (overall 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was 0.85), and sphericity (Bartlett's test of sphericity was 
statistically significant, p < .001).  This analysis yielded one component (hereinafter 
referred to as “language ability”) with an eigenvalue greater than 1 and explained 78.98% 
of the variance, see Table 5 for item loadings.  
 
Table 5 
Loadings of the principal components analysis for language abilities (raw scores). 
Tasks Component 1 
PPVT–4 .84 
TROG–2 .83 
WRMT–3: Basic Reading 
 
.92 
WRMT–3: Reading Comprehension 
 
.96 





Age-Related Changes in Representational Thought 
The first aim of the current study was to replicate age-related developments in 
temporal representation among tasks of temporal cognition (Months Relative Order and 
Time Labeling), diachronic thinking (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree) and behavioral 
prediction (Character Intentions).  Pearson correlation coefficients revealed that accuracy 
on the Months Relative Order, r(60) = .48, p < .001, Time Labeling, r(60) = .44, p < .001, 
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Draw Lifecycle of a Tree, r(60) = .23, p = .07, and Character Intentions, r(60) = .32, p = 
.01, tasks increased with age (in months).  This provides confirmation of age-related 
improvements in representational thought documented in previous research; however, the 
diachronic thinking task (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree) did not reach significance.  
Correlations Among Representational Tasks 
The second aim of the study was to examine whether performance on two 
traditional measures of temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling abilities) are 
related to performance on tasks of diachronic thinking and behavioral prediction.  Each of 
the four tasks were significantly correlated with one another (Table 6), suggesting a 
relationship between four disparate forms of temporal representation. 
 
Table 6 
Pearson correlation coefficients between temporal representation tasks. 
 Time Labeling Draw Lifecycle  of a Tree 
Character 
Intentions 
Zero-Order Correlations    
Months-Relative-Order .64**** .39***   .39*** 
Time Labeling – .46****   .37*** 
Draw Lifecycle of a Tree – – .33** 
Partial Correlations 
(controlling for age) 
 
   
Months-Relative-Order .55**** .33** .28* 
Time Labeling –    .41**** .27* 
Draw Lifecycle of a Tree – – .28* 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .005, ****p < .001 
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Principal Components Analysis 
The third aim of the study was to evaluate whether the shared variance in 
performance across the four tasks provide evidence that underlying changes in 
representational thought apply across disparate aspects of cognition related to the 
understanding of time.  The principal components analysis met the assumptions of 
linearity (all variables had at least one correlation coefficient greater than 0.30; see Table 
6 for zero-order correlations), sampling adequacy (overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
was 0.73) and sphericity (Bartlett's test of sphericity was statistically significant, p < 
.001).  The principal components analysis revealed one underlying factor (hereinafter 
referred to as “temporal representation”) with an eigenvalue greater than 1.  This factor 




Loadings of the principal components analysis for temporal representation tasks. 
Tasks Component 1 













   
 49 
The Role of Language and Nonverbal Abilities 
Next, we ran partial correlations, controlling for age (in months), between 
temporal representation (latent variable) and raw scores of measures of verbal and 
nonverbal abilities (Table 8).  Finally, we examined the relationship between temporal 
representation and assessments of nonverbal intelligence, working memory, and 
language.  We conducted stepwise regression analysis with temporal representation 
(latent variable) as the outcome measure and entered age (months) in Step 1, nonverbal 
intelligence (raw scores) and working memory in Step 2, and language abilities (latent 
variable) in Step 3.  
 
Table 8 
Partial correlations controlling for age between temporal representation and verbal and 
nonverbal tasks (raw scores). 
 
Assessments Temporal Representation (latent variable) 
Nonverbal Intelligence  .33** 
Working Memory .32* 
Language Abilities (latent variable)    .59**** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ****p < .001 
 
 
Results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 9.  At Step 1, age 
contributed significantly to temporal representation, F(1, 60) = 19.44, p < .001, 
accounting for 24.5% of the variation.  At Step 2 nonverbal intelligence and working 
memory accounted for an additional 12.8% of the variance, F(3, 58) = 11.47, p < .001, 
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and at Step 3, language abilities explained an additional 15.6% of the variation, F(4, 57) 
= 15.97, p < .001.  Results revealed that language abilities predicted gains in temporal 
representation over and above effects of age, nonverbal intelligence, and working 
memory.  Indeed, these three variables were no longer significant predictors at Step 3.   
 
Table 9 
Stepwise multiple regression coefficients with temporal representation as the outcome 
variable. 
Predictors Beta (E) t 
Step 1:   
Age (months) .49     4.41**** 
Step 2:   
Age (months) .27 2.15* 
TONI–3 .27 2.16* 
Working Memory .24 2.04* 
Step 3:   
Age (months) .10 0.86 
TONI–3 .08 0.69 
Working Memory .12 1.15 
Language Abilities (latent variable) .54      4.34**** 
*p < .05, ****p < .001 
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Language as a Mediating Variable 
Taken together, the regression results suggest that language abilities mediate the 
effects of age, nonverbal intelligence and working memory on temporal representation.  
To explicitly test mediation, we employed bootstrapping to estimate the 95% confidence 
intervals of the indirect effect, using the procedure suggested by Hayes and Preacher 
(2012) for multiple independent variables and the associated SPSS macro (PROCESS, 
downloaded from http://www.afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html).  
Mediation is assumed to be present when the confidence interval for the indirect effect 
does not include 0.  The confidence intervals for the indirect effect of all predictors on 
temporal representation, based on 5,000 bootstrap samples, was 0.0045 – .0224. 
Inspection of the independent indirect effects of each individual independent variable 
showed that the effects of age, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory on temporal 













Figure 6. Figure displaying language abilities as a mediator of the effect of age, 
nonverbal intelligence, and working memory on temporal representation. 
 
 
Individual Language Measures as Predictors  
To further explore the role of language in the development of temporal 
representation, five additional stepwise regression models were run with each individual 
language task (raw scores) as predictors in Step 3.  For all language variables, Step 3 was 
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Table 10 
Stepwise multiple regression coefficients for language measures separately entered at 
step 3 with temporal representation as the outcome variable. 
Predictors Beta (E) t 
PPVT–4 .46 3.85**** 
TROG–2 .30 2.43* 
WRMT–3: Basic Reading .34 2.77** 
WRMT–3: Reading Comprehension .51 3.86**** 
WRMT–3: Oral Reading Fluency .50 4.67**** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ****p < .001 
 
 
The model with receptive vocabulary (PPVT) entered at Step 3 was significant, 
F(4, 57) = 14.37, p < .001, ∆R2 = .13, with PPVT being the only significant predictor at 
this step (Eage = .11;  ETONI = .17; EWM = .15; EPPVT = .46).  The model with receptive 
grammar (TROG) entered at Step 3 was significant, F(4, 57) = 10.80, p < .001, ∆R2 = .06, 
with TROG and age being significant predictors at this step (Eage = .27;  ETONI = .12; EWM 
= .18; ETROG = .30).  The model with basic reading entered at Step 3 was significant, F(4, 
57) = 11.51, p < .001, ∆R2 = .07, with basic reading being the only significant predictor at 
this step (Eage = .18;  ETONI = .15; EWM = .18; EBasicR = .34).  The model with reading 
comprehension entered at Step 3 was significant, F(4, 57) = 14.39, p < .001, ∆R2 = .13, 
with reading comprehension being the only significant predictor at this step (Eage = 
.07;  ETONI = .11; EWM = .14; ERComp = .51).  Lastly, the model with oral reading fluency 
entered at Step 3 was significant, F(4, 57) = 16.40, p < .001, ∆R2 = .16, with oral reading 
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fluency being the only significant predictor at this step (Eage = .08;  ETONI = .17; EWM = 
.15; EORFluency = .50).  For all language variables except receptive grammar, the effects of 
age, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory were subsumed by language 
ability.  For the model with receptive grammar (TROG), age remained a significant 
predictor of temporal representation at step 3, t = 2.28, p = .03. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Summary 
This study explored the contributions of age, language and nonverbal abilities on 
the representational development of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and 
behavioral prediction.  In the literature, these disparate forms of temporal representation 
have been separately explored (e.g., Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Boucher et al., 2007; 
Friedman, 2005; Montangero et al., 1996; 2000; Nelson, 1996).  The current study 
provides an attempt to explore tasks measuring these disparate forms of temporal 
knowledge within the same sample.  Here, a community sample of 62 6- to 10-year-old 
children completed two assessments of temporal cognition (event ordering and time 
labeling), one assessment of diachronic thinking, and one assessment of behavioral 
prediction, as well as a battery of language and nonverbal assessments.  The results 
generally confirmed age-related changes in temporal representation that have been 
documented in the literature.  Results also highlighted the contribution of language 
(receptive vocabulary, receptive grammar, and literacy) over the contributions of age and 
nonverbal abilities to performance on the four tasks.  Indeed, language mediated the 
effects of age, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory.  In the sections that follow, 
results are discussed in light of the four research questions posed in the introduction. 
Discussion and Implications 
Age-Related Improvements in Representational Thought  
Research from the disparate literature points to similar representational 
development across aspects of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral 
prediction, i.e., an emergence during the preschool years (Atance & O’Neill, 2005; 
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Friedman, 2005; Nelson, 1996) and dramatic refinement through middle childhood (e.g., 
Boucher et al., 2007; Friedman, 2000; Montangero et al., 1996; 2000; Moore et al., 
2014).  The results of the current study provide partial support for these developmental 
trends.  The relationship between age and each of the tasks replicated previous research 
about developmental improvements throughout middle childhood except for the 
diachronic thinking (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree) task, which was not significantly 
correlated with age.  One possible explanation is the use of a stricter coding scheme in 
terms of defining qualitative change from that used by Boucher and colleagues (2007) 
which could have resulted in lower scores.  Another possible explanation is that the three 
other tasks (Months Relative Order, Time Labeling, Character Intentions) relied more on 
socio-cultural knowledge and experience than the diachronic thinking task which requires 
formal teaching of biological knowledge.  Thus, perhaps the three socio-cultural tasks 
were more closely tied to age-related changes in representational thought. 
However, a more likely explanation for the diachronic thinking results may be the 
difficulty of the task for the age range in this study.  Montangero and colleagues (e.g., 
Maurice-Naville & Montangero, 1992; Montangero et al., 1996; Pons & Montangero, 
1999; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992) suggest that diachronic thinking involving the 
understanding of qualitative biological change does not reach maturity until the age of 11 
to 12 years.  Indeed, the average accuracy for this task was 60.5% compared to the other 
three tasks which had accuracy scores above 70%.  As such, future research should 
include older children to fully capture the trajectory of diachronic thinking.  However, 
despite the nonsignificant relationship between diachronic thinking and age in the current 
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sample, the temporal representation latent variable was significantly predicted by age in 
the first step of the regression model. 
Relationships Among Temporal Representation Tasks 
The results suggest that the forms of representational knowledge explored in this 
study (temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral prediction) require similar 
cognitive abilities that are verbally mediated.  Each of the four assessments (Months 
Relative Order, Time Labeling, Draw Lifecycle of a Tree, and Character Intentions) 
displayed significant positive correlations with one another.  The Months Relative Order 
task required children to determine the next month in a sequence when presented with a 
choice between a month, 2-months and 8-months in the future.  This temporal cognition 
ability requires children to not only understand the months of the year, but to have a firm 
grasp of their order within the calendar.  The Time Labeling task required children to 
provide the month(s) or day(s) of the week for significant holidays and events.  This 
temporal cognition task served as a measure of children’s ability to label conventional 
time concepts.  The Draw Lifecycle of a Tree task required children to draw pictures of a 
tree depicting the entire lifecycle from seedling to death.  This diachronic thinking task 
assessed children’s understanding of biological change over time.  Lastly, the Character 
Intentions task required children to make predictions about a character’s behavior based 
on the order of previous events.  This behavioral prediction task measured children’s 
understanding of the causal aspect of temporal sequences.  Together, these tasks comprise 
a variety of forms of temporal representation. 
The ability to understand the sequence of events (temporal, biological and 
behavioral) may require similar cognitive representations of familiar and routine 
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events.  Nelson (1996) has shown that children possess generalized event representations 
(e.g., general knowledge about familiar events) that are used to define the expected 
sequence of events.  Children also rely on these generalized event representations to aid 
in general cognitive abilities such as memory, story production, and planning (Hudson et 
al., 1995; Nelson & Gruendel, 1981).  As such, it is likely that children rely on these 
generalized event representations to order the months of a holiday, provide time labels for 
familiar holidays/events, depict the sequence in a tree’s life, and predict the behavior of a 
character during an event.  
Not surprisingly, the most strongly correlated were the two temporal cognition 
tasks (Months Relative Order and Time Labeling) both adapted from Friedman (2000).  
These two tasks were measures of vocabulary/fact-based temporal concepts and patterns.  
Indeed, the ability to pass the Months Relative Order task requires the ability to label the 
months of the year and to place them in temporal order.  However, it is interesting to note 
that although diachronic thinking and behavioral prediction have been explored as 
separate cognitive abilities in the literature, these tasks were correlated with the two 
temporal cognition tasks, as well as with each other.   
Shared Variance Across Temporal Tasks: Evidence of an Underlying Construct? 
All four tasks loaded similarly onto one factor that explained almost 58% of the 
variance.  According to Nelson (1996), we make sense of time in terms of the ordering of 
events and temporal relations, abstract manipulations of time concepts, natural biological 
rhythms, and an understanding of the self and other through time.  McCormack (2015) 
suggests that in addition to this list, we must understand the causal relation between 
events/actions in the past, present, and future.  Taken together, these theories suggest that 
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the shared variance across tasks measuring temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and 
behavioral prediction may provide evidence for an underlying construct of temporal 
representation. Yet, the one principal component explained just slightly more than half of 
the variance across tasks, leaving approximately 42% of the variance unexplained.   
Another explanation is that the shared variance may only be reflecting broader 
cognitive changes in middle childhood.  This shared variance likely includes some 
feature of temporal representation, but there may be more general cognitive processes 
that are playing a greater role, particularly those processes that are verbally mediated.  
For example, the behavioral prediction task (Character Intentions) was taken from the 
literature on theory of mind and the diachronic thinking task (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree) 
from the literature on children’s understanding of biological and qualitative change 
across time.  Although these two tasks required temporal abilities, i.e., an understanding 
of the causal relations between events in time (McCormack, 2015) and an understanding 
of the natural biological rhythms that cycle through time (Nelson, 1996; Montangero, 
1996), respectively, they are also indices of additional complex cognitive abilities.  As 
such, it may be that the shared variance reflects a more general shift in representational 
thought, rather than strictly temporal abilities. 
This explanation reflects the findings of Moore and colleagues (2014) who used a 
larger battery of event ordering, time labeling and diachronic thinking tasks and found 
two factors: one component that was associated with performance across all tasks and 
measures of vocabulary and nonverbal intelligence and a second component that 
distinguished the diachronic thinking synthesis task (conceiving a temporal succession of 
events as a unitary whole) from the spatial (marking events spatially in time using a 
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picture of a road) and labeling (providing conventional time concepts for the months of 
holidays) tasks.  This suggests that the ability to “envision and name an event given a set 
of distinct sub-events (i.e., moments in time) was unrelated to knowledge of conventional 
time patterns” (Moore et al., 2014; p. 289).  It may be that the first component in their 
study reflected greater cognitive development, rather than specific advances in temporal 
abilities; whereas the second factor was able to distinguish between temporal cognition 
and diachronic thinking tasks suggesting that these abilities may not be as closely tied 
beyond broader cognitive changes. 
Indeed, both Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Nelson (1996) propose theories of 
representational development within and across cognitive domains as a function of 
representational change from implicit procedural knowledge to explicit and flexible 
mental representations throughout infancy and childhood. The results of the current study 
do not have the power to arbitrate between the two theories (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith’s 
representational resdescription and Nelson’s experiential view of representational 
development), but rather suggests that both may explain the general developmental gains 
in temporal representation during middle childhood. 
Influence of Nonverbal Abilities 
Temporal representation was related to nonverbal intelligence and working 
memory abilities.  A representation of time requires the flexibility of thought and draws 
on the ability to hold on to multiple representations at once and the ability to detect and 
represent patterns.  These executive function skills are also required to complete the 
assessments of nonverbal intelligence and working memory used in the current 
study.  Working memory is important in planning, particularly in the development, 
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maintenance, and execution of plans (Gilhooly, 2005; Owen, 1997).  Hudson and 
colleagues have proposed that knowledge about the world, particularly event knowledge, 
plays an integral role in the development of plans (Hudson & Fivush, 1991; Hudson et 
al., 1995).  A variety of tasks and standardized measures have been designed to assess 
planning skills as they relate to executive function (Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; 
Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001; Gardner & Rogoff, 1990; Hudson et al., 1995).  
However, this study is, to our knowledge, the first to explore the effects of working 
memory on a battery of temporal representation tasks measuring temporal cognition, 
diachronic thinking, and behavioral prediction.  Our findings expand upon the work of 
Moore and colleagues (2014), which reported links between temporal representation and 
nonverbal intelligence, to highlight the role of working memory in the development of 
temporal skills.  Together, this suggests that there may be a link between general 
(nonverbal) cognitive abilities and the ability to recognize and represent temporal 
concepts, patterns, change, and causality. 
Language as the Mechanism for Representational Change  
 Although age, nonverbal intelligence, and working memory were significant 
predictors of temporal representation, the results suggest that these effects are mediated 
by language skills.  When entered into the regression model at the final step, language 
abilities alone accounted for the added variance.  This supports the theoretical views of 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Nelson (1996), who emphasize the role of language, albeit 
differently, in representational development.  According to Karmiloff-Smith (1992), at 
the final level of representational redescription, links across common microdomains can 
be made, and then eventually links across domains, using the “cross-system code…close 
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enough to natural language for easy translation into stable, communicable form” (p. 23).  
In the current study, language would allow manipulations of knowledge to occur across 
the microdomains of temporal cognition, diachronic thinking, and behavioral prediction.  
For Nelson (1996) language plays a role in representational development through its use 
during and about events.  As children participate in everyday activities, they internalize 
information about events to form mental event representations that become more flexible 
and accessible to verbal reporting.  As these representations are refined, children become 
able to make sense of and verbally represent time.  Both theoretical positions make the 
case for the critical role of language in representational development; yet, only Nelson 
(1996) proposed a theory for how language would contribute to a representation of time, 
making it difficult for the current study to arbitrate between these theories. However, the 
current results provide initial evidence of representational changes in temporal 
knowledge throughout middle childhood as mediated by language. 
It is important to note that all tasks required verbal instructions, and an 
understanding of said instructions, in addition to the linguistic demands of the tasks 
themselves.  Although two of the tasks (Draw Lifecycle of a Tree and Character 
Intention) did not require verbal responses, participants tended to use language to guide 
them in completing the task or to help explain their responses.  Participants also used this 
type of private speech to aid in their completion of the Months Relative Order task.  This 
observation matches Friedman’s (1990) findings that children have a difficult time 
starting at an arbitrary point when asked to order the days of the week and months of the 
year; children tend to start at the beginning (e.g., Sunday and January) and proceed in 
order until they reach this arbitrary starting point.  
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This can be directly connected to Karmiloff-Smith’s (1992) theory where 
proceduralized knowledge occurs prior to explicit (i.e., consciously accessible) 
representations that can eventually be manipulated and verbalized.  This would suggest 
that younger children may rely more on procedural knowledge to solve temporal tasks 
than older children who have temporal representations in a format similar to natural 
language that allows for both conscious access and verbalization.  Here, the temporal 
representation tasks were neither audio- nor video-recorded and as such, conclusions 
cannot be drawn regarding the verbal strategies used during task completion, something 
that future tasks should explore in relation to representational development during middle 
childhood.  
In the current study, language was restricted to receptive vocabulary, grammar, 
and literacy.  However, this is only part of the range of language skills refined during 
middle childhood.  In addition to incorporating semantic and syntactic assessments, 
future studies should explore expressive language abilities and the role of conversation.  
Nelson and Fivush (2004) have documented the role of conversation in the development 
of episodic memory and personal narrative ability: language provides the organizational 
structure for personal experience, it provides the representational format for positioning 
the self in time through narrative discourse, and enables children to enter into dialogues 
with others and engage in perspective taking.  Therefore, early conversations with parents 
may be integral to the development of the language skills required of temporal 
representation. 
Evidence suggests that children’s speech reflects the language patterns of adults 
and that mother-child interactions during events influence children’s later recall; for 
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example, children whose mothers provided more details during an event reported more 
details of that event after a delay than children of less elaborative mothers (Haden, 
Ornstein, Eckerman, & Didow, 2001).  In this study, mothers interacted with their 30- to 
40-month-old children around three novel play events (birdwatching, camping, and ice-
cream shop).  In the birdwatching event, mother and child went on a birdwatching 
adventure in the lab.  They were first asked to select from an array of birdwatching gear 
(e.g., binoculars, bird-callers, clothing) to use in their adventure.  Then the dyads used 
these tools to explore the lab, finding clues (e.g., feathers, eggs) that lead them to various 
locations of birds.  Lastly, the dyad retrieved the birds and brought them to a new garden 
location with trees, flowers, birdhouses, and birdfeeders.  The camping and ice-cream 
shop events were set up in a similar fashion.  Children were asked to recall these events 1 
day or 1 week later.  The few details that children recalled were the aspects of the events 
that mothers talked about and children responded to either verbally or nonverbally (e.g., 
pointing).  Therefore, future research should explore the influence of parental input, 
particularly in terms of temporal concepts and event representations, on children’s 
temporal representation abilities. 
It is important to note that the relationship between language and temporal 
representation held regardless of the language measure used in the current study; the 
independent regression models with each individual language measures remained 
significant (in the model with receptive grammar, the effect of age remained significant 
in the final step).  This suggests that it is not one specific language ability, but rather 
verbal abilities in general that contributes the development of representational thought.  
This is consistent with Bates’ (1998; Bates & Goodman, 1997) discussion of the 
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inseparability of grammar and the lexicon (i.e., that the same mechanisms used to acquire 
vocabulary are used to acquire grammar), a challenge to traditional linguistic nativism 
and grammatical autonomy (e.g., Chomsky, 1965).   Bates suggests that “the 
heterogeneous set of linguistic forms that occur in any natural language (i.e., words, 
morphemes, phrase structure types) may be acquired and processed by a unified 
processing system, one that obeys a common set of activation and learning principles” 
(1997, p. 135).   
The current findings also confirm those from the literature on language and theory 
of mind abilities.  For example, a meta-analysis on young children’s understanding of 
false-belief explored the role of language in 104 studies (N = 8,891; Milligan et al., 
2007).  The meta-analysis explored language in terms of general language, receptive 
vocabulary, semantics, syntax, and memory for complements.  Results indicated 
significant moderate effect sizes for each language aspect independent of age, suggesting 
that theory of mind skills are not reliant upon any particular aspect(s) of language, but 
rather language in general.  This is contradictory to de Villier’s (2005) theory that false-
belief understanding is contingent upon the child’s ability to master the grammar of 
complements.  As such, future studies of temporal representation, particularly studies 
involving the prediction of behaviors or projection of the self into the future (abilities that 
draw on theory of mind skills), should incorporate additional measures of semantics and 
syntax in order to further disentangle the relationship between representation and 
language. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
This study adds to the literature demonstrating the developmental trends in 
temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling), diachronic thinking, and 
behavioral prediction throughout middle childhood.  These abilities, particularly those 
that require forward-ordering abilities, may be especially important in the study of the 
development of episodic foresight (i.e., the ability to imagine personal future events; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). When planning for future events, it is important, and 
necessary, to consider when the event will take place (Hudson & Mayhew, 2011).  It is 
also likely that imagining possible future events may employ similar mechanisms to 
imagining (i.e., “re-living”) events from the past (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Busby & 
Suddendorf, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 1985) and rely on general 
cognitive skills such as executive function and working memory (Ford, Driscoll, Shum, 
& Macaulay, 2012). Indeed, support for this theory comes from studies with individuals 
with episodic memory deficits.  Research shows that these individuals present with 
difficulties imagining events that might happen in their personal future as well as 
recalling their personal past (Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009; Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2008; D’Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008; Klein, 
Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Tulving, 1985). 
This study did not incorporate measures of episodic memory or foresight, and 
therefore is limited in its ability to generalize the developmental improvements found in 
the current study to more “autonoetic” (i.e., the awareness of our existence and identity 
extending from the personal past through the present to the future) domains of temporal 
representation.  Tulving (1972; 1985) suggests that the ability to travel through time and 
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represent events temporally is a function of the declarative memory system (e.g., it 
requires semantic knowledge of general temporal concepts and episodic knowledge on 
one’s personal experiences).  For example, it is our semantic memory that allows us to 
recall the location and appearance of our childhood home, but it is our episodic memory 
that allows us to recall, and re-experience, the emotions and events during our first family 
Christmas in that home.  Researchers (Mahr & Csibra, in press; Nelson, 1996) have 
proposed similar representational mechanisms of episodic memory development as those 
proposed for temporal understanding in general.  Nelson’s experiential theory has been 
discussed at length in this dissertation and as such will not be revisited here; however, 
Mahr and Csibra (in press) offer a metarepresentational approach suggesting that episodic 
memory plays a generative role in communicative interaction.  They draw a distinction 
between event memories and episodic memories.  Both share the qualities of being quasi-
experiential, event specific, and past-directed.  However, event memories include more 
limited source information, are not located in subjective time, are not self-referential, are 
not always conscious, and do not have a narrative structure; whereas episodic memory is 
autonoetic and epistemically generative. 
Future research should therefore explore differences in semantic temporal 
representation and episodic temporal representation during this time period (i.e., middle 
childhood). Research on other forms of temporal representation (i.e., event ordering, time 
labeling, diachronic thinking, predicting future behaviors, and episodic memory) has 
shown developmental trends throughout middle childhood regarding the ability to think 
about the past and future.  Therefore, it would follow that similar trends would exist in 
episodic foresight abilities.  Future event ordering may be especially important in the 
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study of the development of episodic foresight in that when planning for future events, it 
is important, and necessary, to consider when the event will take place (Hudson & 
Mayhew, 2011).  Thinking about an event that will take place tomorrow may be different 
from thinking about an event that will take place next year. 
An additional limitation to the present study is the somewhat small size of the 
sample for the number of analyses that were run.  Future studies that use the same 
methods should collect data from a larger group of children in order to increase the 
chances of detecting small to moderate effects.  Additionally, due to the vast variability in 
temporal representation abilities, researchers may want to include children encompassing 
a wider age range, from 5- to 12-years.  This may be especially important in findings that 
use additional measures of diachronic thinking abilities, as Montangero and colleagues 
(Maurice-Naville & Montangero, 1992; Montangero et al., 1996; Pons & Montangero, 
1999; Tryphon & Montangero, 1992) suggest that these skills continue to develop 
through the age of 12 years.  Future studies may also wish to consider including a more 
diverse sample in terms of socioeconomic status.  Flores (as cited in Nelson, 1996) found 
that Headstart children from homeless and poverty homes performed more poorly on 
sequencing tasks and temporal knowledge, indicating that poverty may influence MERs 
and temporal representation in general and should be explored further, particularly in 
regard to the effect of language on temporal skills. 
Lastly, the present study focused on the relationship between language and 
temporal representation in typically developing, English-speaking children and thus is 
limited in its generalizability.  Future research should explore the development of 
temporal representation in languages other than English and include a range of clinical 
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populations, particularly children with autism spectrum disorders.  Autism spectrum 
disorder is characterized by impairments in social-communication and restricted interests 
and inflexible or repetitive behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2013); research 
with this population has also documented difficulties in theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 
Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997), executive function (Hill, 2004), and language 
abilities (Tager-Flusberg, 1996). Difficulties in these domains may make it difficult for 
individuals with autism to project themselves forward and backward in time.  Indeed, 
research has highlighted marked impairments in diachronic thinking (Boucher et al., 
2007), episodic memory (Goldman, 2008; Goldman & DeNigris, 2015; Terret et al., 
2013), and future thinking (Terret et al., 2013) among school-aged children with autism 
spectrum disorder.  As the results of the current study suggest, language plays a critical 
role the development of temporal representation and therefore should be explored further 
among this clinical population.   
Conclusions 
This study examined the relationship between disparate measures of temporal 
representation that have emerged in the literature.  Research has independently explored 
developments in temporal cognition (event ordering and time labeling), diachronic 
thinking, and behavioral prediction, but none to date have examined the relationship 
among these four abilities in connection to advances in language, nonverbal intelligence, 
and working memory.  This study builds on prior work to explore the developmental 
trajectory of these representational skills through middle childhood, a time when children 
are attending school and experiencing dramatic gains in cognitive function.  Results 
suggest that age-related developments in temporal representation are mediated by general 
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language abilities, a view that is consistent with Nelson’s (1996) view of language 
acquisition and children’s conceptualization of time.  Given the importance of an 
advanced representation of time on one’s ability to effectively manage the demands of 
daily life, future work should explore the role that differences in temporal skills in middle 





APPENDIX A: PARENT/GUARDIAN QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
A. 
Child's Name: ________________________________________________ Age: _____________  
Date of Birth: ___________________ Home Phone Number: ____________________________ 
School: _____________________________________________________ Grade: ____________ 
 
Mother's Name: _________________________________________________________________ 
Occupation:____________________________________________________________________ 
Highest Level of Education: Less than High School/GED______     High School/GED ______   
Some College but No Degree ______   Associate’s Degree ______   Bachelor’s Degree ______ 
Master’s Degree ______     PhD______      JD/MD______    Prefer not to say ______ 
 
Father's Name: _________________________________________________________________ 
Occupation:____________________________________________________________________ 
Highest Level of Education: Less than High School/GED______     High School/GED ______   
Some College but No Degree ______   Associate’s Degree ______   Bachelor’s Degree ______ 
Master’s Degree ______     PhD______      JD/MD______    Prefer not to say ______ 
 
 
Race/Ethnicity (check as many as applicable) 
 
⎕ White/Caucasian 
⎕ Black/African American/Caribbean 
⎕ Hispanic/Latino/a 
⎕ Asian  
⎕ Middle Eastern 








List as many different languages that are spoken at home (for example, English, French, Spanish, 
Patois, Arabic, etc.):   __________________       __________________      __________________ 
_______________       __________________       __________________      _________________ 
What is your child’s primary language? ______________________________________________  
What other languages does your child speak? _________________________________________        
 
Mother’s Primary Language: _____________________________________________________ 
Other languages the mother speaks fluently: _________________________________________ 
Father’s Primary Language: ______________________________________________________ 
Other languages the father speaks fluently: ___________________________________________ 
 
Who are the people the child frequently interacts with (parents, siblings, grandparents, nanny, 
etc.)? 
Name                Age      Relationship                Language spoken 
_______________________     _______     ______________________     __________________                                                                                                                                                             
_______________________     _______     ______________________     __________________                                                                                                                                                            
_______________________     _______     ______________________     __________________                                                                                                                                                            
_______________________     _______     ______________________     __________________                                                                                                                                                            
_______________________     _______     ______________________     __________________                                                                                                                                                            
_______________________     _______     ______________________     __________________                                                                                                                                                            
_______________________     _______     ______________________     __________________                                                                                                                                                             
_______________________     _______     ______________________     __________________                                                                                                                                                            








Is your child's speech difficult to understand?  No ______ Yes  ______  
   (If YES, please explain) _________________________________________________ 
Do you think your child exhibits a language delay?  No ______ Yes  ______  
   (If YES, please explain) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
   (If YES, when did you first notice the language delay? 
_____________________________________    
 
 
Is there any history of the following in the family (check all that apply):  
   Speech/Language disorders _____    Hearing impairments _____     Learning disorders _____ 
   (If YES, please explain) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Has your child been evaluated by or worked with any of the following? (check all that apply): 
   Ear Nose and Throat (ENT) Doctor ______        Neurologist ______       Psychologist ______           
   Speech Language Pathologist ______        Audiologist ______       Reading Specialist ______       
   Occupational Therapist _____   Physical Therapist _____   Other_______________________  
   (If YES, please explain) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you think your child hears well? No ______ Yes  ______  








Does your child exhibit any antisocial or socially inappropriate behaviors (for example, avoiding 
interactions, consistently playing alone, etc.)?  No ______ Yes  ______  
   (If YES, please explain) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Does your child exhibit any repetitive behaviors or self-stimulating behaviors (for example, 
rocking or arm flapping, etc.) for no apparent reason? No ______ Yes  ______  
   (If YES, please explain) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Does your child maintain eye contact? No ______ Yes  ______  





Can your child tell time?  No ______ Yes  ______  
Does your child wear a watch?  No ______    Yes, frequently______    Yes, occasionally ______  
Does your child use a calendar?    No _____    Yes, frequently _____    Yes, occasionally ______  
Does your child keep track of his/her own schedules and deadlines?   
            No ______    Yes, frequently ______    Yes, occasionally ______  
 
 







APPENDIX B: PARENT DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
Parents’ demographic information. Frequencies reported (percentages in parentheses). 
 
Mothers Fathers 
Highest Level of Education 
  
Less than a High School 
Degree 3 (5.1%) 4 (6.8%) 
High School or GED 6 (10.2%) 12 (20.3%) 
Associate’s Degree 5 (8.5%) 3 (5.1%) 
Some College but no Degree 8 (13.6%) 3 (5.1%) 
Bachelor's Degree 16 (27.1%) 18 (30.5%) 
Master's Degree 15 (25.4%) 12 (20.3%) 
PhD 5 (8.5%) 3 (5.1%) 
MD/JD 0 1 (1.7%) 
Prefer not to say 1 (1.7%) 4 (6.8%) 
Primary Language   
English 44 (74.6%) 44 (74.6%) 
Other 15 (25.4%) 12 (20.3%) 
NA ─ 3 (5%) 







APPENDIX C: PARENTAL REPORT OF CHILD LANGUAGE ABILITIES 
Frequencies reported (percentages in parentheses). 
 
Speech Difficult to Understand Speech Delay 
No 56 (94.9%) 55 (93.2%) 
Yes 3 (5.1%) 4 (6.8%) 
 
Note: All children reported here (n = 59) met clinical cut-offs for language disorders on 
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